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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THERMOID WESTERN CO., NORMAN THOMPSON LUMBER &
HARDWARE CO., INC., UTAH
POULTRY & FARMERS COOPERATIVE, UTAH LUMBER CO.,
and STOKERMATIC CO., on their
own behalf and on behalf of other
persons, corporations, and associations similarly situated,
Plaintiffs arnd Appella;nts,

vs.

Case
No. 9324

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, THE DENVER AND RIO
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, THE WESTERN PACIFIC COMPANY and
BAMBERGER RAILROAD COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF O·F RESP·ONDENT·s
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover amounts paid by plaintiffs, representing a general increase of 15 per cent in
freight rates on traffic moving \vholly within the State of
Utah between June 22, 1956, and August 28, 1958.
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The Interstate Commerce Commission will be sometimes referred to herein as I.C.C. and the Public Service
Commission of Utah as P.S.C.U. Emphasis is supplied
unless otherwise indica ted.
Defendants and respondents can only agree partially
with appellants' Statement of the Case and Statement of
Facts as contained in plaintiffs' brief. In appellants' "Introduction'' as well as throughout the majority of appellants' brief counsel assumes and states as fact the
main point in issue. He assumes that the I.C.C. order
was void and that the ''proper and valid charges'' were
the lower rates for which he contends, although the rates
as increased pursuant to the I.C.C. order were "the tariffs on file with'' the P.S.C.U. The question of the validity and effect of the I.C.C. order pursuant to which
tariffs setting such rates or charges were filed with the
P.S.C.U., is the most important and controlling question
which must be here decided.
Appellants refer to the decision of the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals in Structural Steel & Forge Co.
v. Unrion Pacific RR., 269 F. 2d 714, saying such court held
that there was no federal question involved. Reference
to the opinion in thaf case will show that the court held
merely that a removable case had not been stated in the
complaint, in spite of the fact that plaintiff had referred
to the I.C.C. order and characterized it as void. That
court said at page 718:
''Stripped of its irrelevancies, the removed
claim is that the defendant railroads exacted a
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rate for intrastatP shipments in exress of those
established and on file with the competent statP
regulatory body, and the prayer is for restitution
of the same. • • • The reference then to the void
or vacated order of the Interstate Commerce Commission as a basis for the charges, was not an
essential ingredient of the claim for restitution.
As a gratuitous anticipation of a defense founded
in federal law, it will not suffice to confer federal
court jurisdiction. • • •.''
Although the reference to the I.C.C. order may not
have been essential in plaintiff's pleadings and therefore
gave no basis for removal, nevertheless the effect of that
I. C. C. order and whether or not it was void is ''an essential ingredient of the claim for restitution'' and is fundamental to plaintiff's right to recover.
The Circuit Court held that the validity of the I.C.C.
order was a matter of defense and further stated: "But
even though a valid rate order does emerge to ultimately
condition the right of recovery in these actions • • • at
most, federal law lurks in the background to determine
the result of this litigation.''
It is thus defendant's position that federal law, which
must be referred to in order to determine the validity and
effect of the I.C.C. order and whether or not it was void
ab initio ''must determine the result of this litigation.''
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the Second World War and the years following, with the resulting inflationary spiral, the entire
United States - including the State of Utah - expe-
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rienced successive and repeated increases in wages and
costs in materials; in costs of living and costs of doing
business generally. As these increased costs of operating
a business pyramided one upon another, the railroads
had to make successive requests of the I.C.C. and the
various state commissions for authority to increase their
rates and charges to meet such increased costs. With
respect to interstate traffic the proceedings were not
adversary proceedings but were designated by what is
known as "ex parte" numbers. In the case at bar there
will be six of these ex parte proceedings referred to. These
are Ex Parte 162, Ex Parte 166, Ex Parte 168, Ex Parte
175, Ex Parte 196 and Ex Parte 206. In each ex parte
proceeding the I.C.C. after lengthy investigative hearings ordered increases in freight rates on interstate commerce. In comparable proceedings the railroads asked
the P.S.C.U. for similar increases within the State of
Utah. The P.S.C.U. granted some in Ex Parte 162 and
166, denied others, and completely denied the increases
asked comparable to those granted in Ex Parte 168. In
denying the latter increase, the Utah Commission stated
that the evidence did not ''afford the commission sufficient
information upon which it can determine whether or not
the revenue derived by the railroads from Utah intrastate
traffic is inadequate,'' or whether it would or would not
justify the requested increase. (See Exhibit 7, page 3.)
Upon such denial the railroads made application to
the I.C.C., asking the I.C.C. to investigate such rates
pursuant to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce
Act, 49 U.S.C. 13 (3) ( 4). After such 13th Section investi-
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gation the I.C.C. found that intrastate rates discriminated against interstate rates and directed the P.S.C.U. to
authorize increases intrastate up to the level of Ex Parte
168 interstate increases in absence of which P.S.C.U.
action the I.C.C. itself would issue an order requiring
such increases. The P.S.C.U. made no finding as to justification for such increases other than referring to the
I.C.C. findings and directions and, pursuant thereto, the
P.S.C.U. authorized the increases intrastate "'"hich had
theretofore been denied by them up to the Ex Parte 168
level. (See Exhibit 8.)
Later, interstate rates were further increased by the
I.C.C. in an additional amount of 15 per cent in Ex Parte
175. The P.S.C.U. in corollary proceedings again refused
to authorize the further increases. In so refusing, they
stated exactly as they had done in the prior case -that
they did not consider the evidence sufficient to enable
them to determine whether or not the increases were
justified. (See Exhibit 2C, page 43.)
At the request of the railroads the I. C. C. again undertook an investigation pursuant to Section 13 (3) ( 4) of
the Interstate Commerce Act, in a proceeding designated
by its Docket Number 31484 and found discrimination
resulting from existing Utah intrastate rates and again
directed the P.S.C.U. to authorize the increases, in absence of which the I.C.C. would order them into effect.
(See Exhibit 9.) This time the P.S.C.U. declined to order
the increases, and under date of February 8, 1956, the
I. C. C. issued its order (Exhibit 10) requiring the increases
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to be put into effect on intrastate traffic within the State
of Utah. This is the order under attack in the case at bar.
Tariffs providing for such increases were duly published
and filed with the Public Service Commission of Utah
and stamped as received and ''filed'' by the Commission.
(See K-19-Sheet 14 of Exhibit 4.) Under the tariff so
filed pursuant to such I.C.C. order, increased intrastate
rates became effective June 22, 1956. Court proceedings
as referred to by plaintiff were undertaken, and in Public Service Commission of Utah v. United States, 356 U.S.
421, 2 L.Ed. 2d 886, 78 S. Ct. 796, the United States Supreme Court held the evidence to be deficient in certain
particulars and entered its decision directing that the
I.C.C. order of February 8, 1956, be set aside and that
the matter be remanded to the Interstate Commerce Commission "for further proceedings in conformity with"
the Supreme Court's opinion.
Immediately upon entry of judgment by the Federal
District Court remanding the matter to the I.C.C. for
''further proceedings'' this case was filed by plaintiffs
herein based upon the assumption - not otherwise proven
or shown - that the I.C.C. Report (Ex. 9) and Order
(Ex. 10) were entirely void ab initio.
During the two-year interim, as a result of increased
wages and costs, further increases had been ordered by
the I. C. C. in Ex Parte 196 and Ex Parte 206. Comparable
requests had been filed with the P.S.C.U., "~hich the
P.S.C.U. did not even set for hearing. On remand to the
I.C.C. by the United States District Court for the District
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7
of Utah pursuant to the Supreme Court's direction for
"further proceedings consistent with" its opinion, further hearings were conducted by the I.C.C. and consolidated with additional 13th Section hearings on Ex Parte
196 and Ex Parte 206 increases as they affected Utah
intrastate traffic. After such further hearing the I.C.U.,
under date of December 7, 1959, issued its further report,
finding discrimination still to exist and directing that increases be allowed by the P.S.C.U. (See Exhibit 11.)
When the P.S.C.U. declined, the I.C.C., under date of
March 17, 1960, issued its order directing such increases
to be made effective on Utah intrastate traffic as of May
13, 1960 (Exhibit 12). This latter order is now under
consideration by a three-judge federal court for the District of Utah.
Counsel for plaintiff in his Statement of Facts stated,
re I.C.C. Docket No. 31484, "After hearing, the Interstate
Commerce Commission issued its order taking jurisdic·tion of the Utah intrastate rates and granting the increases sought.'' He thereby attempts to mislead the
court. Not only at that point but several other places in
his brief he refers to the I.C.C. "taking jurisdiction"
of intrastate rates. Nowhere in any investigation by the
I.C.C. or any order issued by it has there been any statement that it was "taking jurisdiction" of intrastate rates.
In no law on the subject is there any reference to ''taking
jurisdiction'' and no case has referred in terms to '' taking jurisdiction.'' In this particular case the I. C. C. issued
no ''order taking jurisdiction.'' On ''petition of the carriers concerned'' ( 49 U.S. C. 13 ( 3)) it undertook an "in-
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vestigation'' as Section 13 of the Act imposed a duty on
it to do. On the first page of its report (Exhibit 9) it
states, ''This proceeding is an investigation under Section 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act into the lawfulness of Utah intrastate freight rates and charges.'' In
that investigation it held a full hearing and "made findings'' as the federal act directs it to do. It found discrimination, and in a subsequent document (Exhibit 10)
it ordered the increases to remove the discrimination. Nowhere, and at no time, was there any "order taking jurisdiction,'' and the increased rates did not become effective
automatically by virtue of its order but only upon publication of tariffs which were "filed" with, and stamped
"filed" by the P.S.C.U. (K19, Exhibit 4, Sheet 14)
Again, on page 7, appellant states, "The mandate of
the Supreme Court was filed in the United States District
Court on August 27, 1958, on which date the Utah intrastate rates 'reverted' to their former level.'' The rates
did not so automatically revert, but the increases had to
be cancelled by the filing of a supplemental tariff, which,
upon judgment of the federal court, \vas issued, published and "filed" with the P.S.C.U. (K36, Sheet 2 of
Exhibit 4)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE I.C.C. HAD AMPLE JURISDICTION
AND ACTED WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION
IN ISSUING ITS ORDER OF FEBRUARY 8,
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1956 (EXHIBIT 10), AKD SUCII ORDER
\\r AS NOT VOID Bl~rr, AT 1IOST, SUBJECT
rro BEING C~ANCELLED AND SET ASIDE,
AND THEREFORE VOIDABLE.

POINT TWO
THE TARIFFS CHARGED AND ( 0LLECTED BY THE DEFENDANT RAILROADS DURING THE PERIOD IN QUESTION WERE EFFECTIVELY ''FILED''
AND WERE THE TARIFFS ''ON FILE AND
IN EFFECT'' AND HAD TO BE COMPLIED
WITH UNDER BOTH FEDERAL AND
UTAH STATE LAW.
1

POINT THREE
THE FURTHER FINDINGS AND REPORT
OF THE I.C.C. OF DECE11BER, 1959 SUPPLEMENT AND SUPPORT THE ORIGINAL
FINDINGS ON WHICH THE ORDER OF
FEBRUARY 8, 1956, WAS BASED AND DETAIL EVIDENCE WHICH THE SUPRE1'1E
COURT SAID WAS LACKING.
POINT FOUR
APPLICATION TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE C01I1IISSION OF UTAH FOR REP ARATIONS IS A PREREQUISITE TO ANY
RIGHT OF REPARATION OR RESTITUTION, REG_._\RDLESS OF THE EFFECT OF
ANY I.C.C. ORDER.
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POINT FIVE
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO BASIS IN EQUITY
FOR ANY RECOVERY.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE I.C.C. HAD AMPLE JURISDICTION
AND ACTED WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION
IN ISSUING ITS ORDER OF FEBRUARY 8,
1956 (EXHIBIT 10), AND SUCH ORDER
WAS NOT VOID BUT, AT MOST, SUBJECT
TO BEING C.ANCELLED AND SET ASIDE,
AND THEREFORE VOIDABLE.
For purposes of argument appellants combined their
Point One and Point Two as stated, and respondents have
thus combined the two in their statement of Point One.
Appellant states that the I.C.C. ''was without jurisdiction to enter the contested order'' and that ''such order
was void from its inception.'' Having so stated, counsel
throughout the major portion of plaintiff's brief assumes
such point to have been proved and argues as to the effect
of void orders or void judgments. The statements from
American Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum
therefore beg the issue, because they merely refer to the
effect of void orders, but before such statements can be
applicable it must be shown that any order in question
is void. If it is an order which is "liable to be vacated or
set aside for irregularity or other cause,'' then, as stated

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
in 49 C.J.S. 878, it is "merely voidable" and the order
in question here as sho\\·n by the very course of the proceedings was one which was ''liable to be vacated or set
aside for irregularity or other cause" and therefore, at
most, voidable. If it was void from its inception, it could
have been disregarded completely and the Supreme Court
would have so stated and there would have been no reason for the Supreme Court to set it aside nor to refer the
matter back to the I. C. C. "for further proceedings."
Counsel refers to the case of Houston E. & TV. T. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 58 L.Ed. 1341, 34 S. Ct.
833. This is normally referred to as the ''Shreveport
Case.'' Again counsel states that there the court held that
the I.C.C. "could take jurisdiction" of intrastate freight
rates. No such holding nor wording is used anywhere in
that case. In that case railroad rates for movement of
traffic between points wholly within Texas were lower
than for similar traffic movements interstate between
Texas points and Shreveport, Louisiana. This discrimination affected competition in commerce to and from
Shreveport. The I.C.C. found that the interstate rates
between Shreveport and Texas points were unjust and
unreasonably high, and its order specified maximum
rates above which the carriers could not go. There were
some commodity rates in Texas \vhich required lower
charges for movement in one direction than for movement of a similar commodity in an opposite direction. The
effect of the I.C.C. order was to allow the railroads to
increase within Texas the lesser of these commodity rates
and to reduce interstate rates between Texas and Shreve-
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port to the higher of these Texas commodity rates. This
thus had the effect of increasing some intrastate rates.
On this point it was contended that Congress had no authority to control intrastate traffic and intrastate rates
and that the I.C.C. had no authority to issue any order
affecting the level of intrastate rates. The word "jurisdiction'' was not mentioned.
In sustaining the power of Congress and the authority of the I.C.C., the United States Supreme Court said
that the essence of power given to Congress to regulate
commerce among the several states was such that (page
350) ''interstate trade was not left to be destroyed or
impeded by the rivalries of local governments.''
Page 353:
''Congress in the exercise of its paramount
power may prevent the common instrumentalities
of interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse from being used in their intrastate operations to the injury of interstate commerce.

"* * * We find no reason to doubt that Congress is entitled to keep the highways of interstate communication open to interstate traffic upon
fair and equal terms. * * * The use of the instruments of interstate commerce in a discriminatory
manner so as to inflict injury upon that commerce,
or some part thereof, furnishes abundant ground
for federal intervention. Nor can the attempted
exercise of state authority alter the matter, "\vhere
Congress has acted, for a state may not authorize
the carrier to do that "\vhich Congress is entitled
to forbid and has forbidden.''
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:

"• • • We conclude that the order of the
commission now in question cannot be held invalid
upon the ground that it exceeded the authoritv
\\'" hich Congress could lawfully confer.''
~
The court then referred to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act as it then existed and added
(page 356):
''This language is certainly sweeping enough
to embrace all of the discriminations of the sort
described which it was in the power of Congress
to condemn.''
Page 358:
''Here, the Commission expressly found that
unjust discrimination existed under substantially
similar conditions of transportation and the
inquiry is whether the Commission had power to
correct it. * * *. We are convinced that the authority of the Commission was adequate.''
The cases of Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bou:les, 321
U.S. 144, 88 L.Ed. 635, and Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308
U.S. 79, 84 L.Ed. 93, cited on pages 11 and 12 of plaintiffs' brief, are not in point. There are sufficient cases
involving freight rates and proceedings by and before
the I.C.C. to show controlling law in this matter and appellants cannot find support for their erroneous assumptions nor any comfort from such cases.
The Davies Warehouse case involved the Federal
Emergency Price Control Act. The question was whether
or not the Davies Warehouse Co. was a public utility; if a
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public utility, the provisions of the Federal Act itself said
it would not come under nor be subject to the federal law
at all. Warehouse business such as was carried on by the
Davies Co. was declared to be a public utility both by the
California Constitution and the California Public Utilities Act. Therefore, the court did not hesitate in saying
that the Emergency Price Control Administrator had no
authority at all to deal in any way with warehouse rates as
set by the California Public Utilities Commission.
The cases of Palmer v. M(J)Ssachusetts, Yonkers v.
U. S. 320 U.S. 685, 80 L.Ed. 400, and Alabama Public
Service Commission v. Southern Ry Co., 341 U.S. 341,
95 L.Ed. 1002, all involved discontinuance or abandonment
of local train service with respect to which the I.C.C. had
been given no jurisdiction or authority of any kind. Such
cases cannot be considered in any way applicable to I. C. C.
action in matters where the law specifically says that on
request the I.C.C. shall make an investigation and issue
findings.
The case of Arkansas Railroad Commission v. Ch~
cago, R.I. & P.R. R. Co., 274 U.S. 597, 71 L. Ed. 1224, did
involve rates where the I.C.C., after hearing, had ordered
increases in rates in Oklahoma, Texas and New Mexico,
and without anything further and \Yith no hearing at all
it ordered increases in Arkansas rates. Appellants can
find nothing in that case to vary or dispute the law as set
forth in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S.
301, 79 L.Ed. 1451, 55 S. Ct. 713, referred to later in this
brief, which case is directly parallel on its facts with the
case at bar.
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On page 11 of his brief counsel numbers as "1'' and
'' 2'' questions which he says the Commission must determine in every Section 13 case. He cites neither statute
nor case law to support the position claimed by him, and
neither the statute nor the cases pose any such questions
in any such manner nor say anything about the I.C.C.
''taking jurisdiction'' of intrastate rates.
Section 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act is headed
''Complaints to and Investigations by Commission,'' and
provides, "It shall be the duty of the Commission to investigate the matters complained of." Subparagraph (3)
of Section 13, under which these proceedings are instituted, authorizes a petition to be filed by any carrier requesting an investigation, and requires the Commission
to notify the state or states interested of the proceedings.
Subparagraph (4) provides that whenever in such an
investigation the Commission after full hearing finds any
undue, unreasonable or unjust discrimination against, or
undue burden on interstate commerce, ''it shall prescribe
the rate • "" • thereafter to be charged, in such manner as,
in its judgment, will remove such * * • discrimination.''
Nowhere is the word ''Jurisdiction'' used.
There is no question, and at this date it cannot be
doubted but what Congress was within its rights in enacting such legislation and the validity of such legislation
has been many times upheld. Florida v. United States,
282 U.S. 194 @ 210, 75 L.Ed. 291, 51 S. Ct. 119, ''The
power of the Congress to authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish intrastate rates in order
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to remove an unjust discrimination against interstate
commerce is not open to dispute.'' (See Wisconsin R. R.
Commission v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 66 L.Ed.
371, 42 St. Ct. 232; Florida v. United States, 292 U. S.
1, 78 L.Ed. 1077, 54 S. Ct. 603; King v. Un.ited States,
344 U.S. 254, 97 L.Ed. 301, 73 S. Ct. 259; Atlantic Coastline
R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 79 L.Ed. 1451, 55
S. Ct. 713).
An analysis of this federal law clearly demonstrates
that carriers are entitled to request an investigation. On
request, it is the duty of the I.C.C. to institute an investigation. A full hearing was had and no argument has
been, or could be made to the contrary. As a result of
the hearing the I.C.C. made findings as it ''Tas required
to do and found discrimination to exist. Under such circumstances there cannot be any valid argument that said
Commission acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
granted to it -in fact, imposed upon it -by federal law.
The question of whether the I. C. C. may have erred in
the exercise of that jurisdiction is another matter, but
there is a difference between power and authority to act
in the first instance and error that will subject such action
to being set aside after that jurisdiction or authority
granted has been pursued. Upon this point we "\Yould like
to refer to the case of Atwood v. Co.r, 88 Utah 437, 55 P.
2d 377, wherein this court distinguishes between lack of
jurisdiction, which is referred to as "lack of power to
proceed'' with a case, and acting erroneously where
proper jurisdiction exists but where in such action a
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court or other body may err in the exercise of that jurisdiction. The court refers to numerous definitions of jurisdiction and states: (at Page 447)
'' 'Of the various definitions of jurisdiction
perhaps the most satisfactory is as follows: Jurisdiction is authority to hear and determine a cause.
Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine, it does not, as will be pointed out later,
depend upon the regularity of the exercise of that
power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions
made.' ''
Page 450:
" 'It cannot be said that if the court correctly
decides a question he is acting within his jurisdiction, but if he erroneously decides it and determines it contrary to the evidence he is acting without jurisdiction.' ''
In Wasatch Oil Refining Co. v. Wade, 92 Utah 50, 63
P. 2d 1070, in upholding jurisdiction and refusing to grant
requested prohibition, this Court again said: (at P. 60)

'' * * * Jurisdiction does not depend upon the
regularity of the exercise of power or on the rightfulness or correctness of decisions made, but is the
power to hear and determine the matter in hand.''
(Citing Atwood v. Cox)
Page 71:
'' * * * We are satisfied that the trial court has
acted within jurisdiction and if it has proceeded
wrongly that it has merely committed error which
may be reviewed and corrected upon appeal.''
There is hardly any dissent from the law as above
stated, and the Supreme Court of the United States has on
various occasions repeated the same. In General Investment Co. v. New York Central R. Co., 271 U. S. 228, 70
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L. Ed. 920, 46 S. Ct. 496, the Supreme Court stated: (at
P. 230)

'' * * * By jurisdiction we mean power to entertain the suit, consider the merits and render a
binding decision thereon; and by merits we mean
the various elements which enter into or qualify
the plaintiff's right to relief sought. There may
be jurisdiction and yet an absence of merits. * * *
Whether a plaintiff seeking such relief has the
requisite standing is a question going to the merits, and its determination is an exercise of jurisdiction. * * * If it be resolved against him the
appropriate decree is a dismissal for want of
merits, not for want of jurisdiction.''
The United States Supreme Court (356 U. S. 421), in
passing on the I.C.C. order in question in the case at bar,
did not declare the order to be void for want of jurisdiction as it might have done had there been any question
about jurisdiction, but it set the order aside and directed
that the matter be referred back to the I.C.C. for further
proceedings in the same matter. This clearly sho,vs that
the Supreme Court had some question as to the ''merits''
of the case but not as to ''jurisdiction.''
In Thompson v. Terminal Shares, 89 F. 2d 652, the
Eighth Circuit Court stated:
''Jurisdiction does not depend upon the rightfulness of the decision. It is not lost because of an
erroneous decision, however erroneous that decision may be. * * * In such case whether the
court decided correctly or incorrectly could not
affect the question of jurisdiction nor the duty of
all person.s having notice to obey the order until
reversed by a court of co1npetent jurisdiction. * * *"

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
See also l~inderup v. Pathe E:rchauge, 2G3 U.S. 291,
60 L.l1~d. 308, -l..t- S. Ct. 96; National Benefit Life Insurance
Co. v. "'-;ha~t·-Jra.Zker Co., 111 F. 2d -!~ri, ( ert. dPn. 311 U.S.
673, 85 L.Ed. 4~~2, 61 S. Ct. 35; Ex Parte Roe, 234 lJ .S.
70, 58 L.Ed. 1217, 34 S. Ct. 722.
1

In lVest Coast Exploration Co. v. Mcl\ay, 213 F. 2d
582, the court in the course of a long and learned opinion
written by Chief Judge Harold M. Stevens stated:
'' • • • A court is said to have jurisdiction, in
the sense that its erroneous action is voidable only,
not void, when the parties are properly hPfore it,
the proceeding is a kind or r lass which the court
is authorized to adjudicate and the claim set forth
in the paper writing invoking the court's action is
not obviously frivolous. * • *"
Certiorari on that case was denied, 347 U.S. 989,
98 L. Ed. 1123, 74 S. Ct. 850. See also Dix v. Dix, 222
S.W. 2d 839 (Ky.).
There is no question but what the I.C.C. had the
power under the Interstate Commerce Act to undertake
the investigation as it did and to issue the order which it
issued. \"Vith respect to the issuance of such orders the
Interstate Commerce Act further provides under Section
15 that whenever in any such investigation after full
hearing the Commission finds any rate to be discriminatory, it is authorized and empowered to prescribe rates
to be thereafter charged and to order that the carrier
shall not thereafter charge any rate other than that so
prescribed.
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Subparagraph (2) of Section 15 of the Interstate
Commerce Act reads :
''Except as otherwise provided in this part, all
orders of the Commission, other than orders for
the payment of money, shall take effect within
such reasonable time, not less than thirty days,
and shaZl continue in force until its further order,
or for a specified period of time, according as
shall be prescribed in the order, unless the same
shall be suspended or modified or set aside by the
Commission or be suspended or set aside by a court
of competent jurisdiction.''
This statutory provision very definitely contemplates
that an order entered by the I. C. C. under the provisions of
Section 13 may be suspended or set aside by the Commission itself or may be suspended or set aside by a
court of competent jurisdiction, but it specifically provides that the order "shall take affect" and "shall continue in force'' until or unless set aside by the Commission itself or "suspended or set aside by a court." From
these provisions it cannot even be inferred that if there
may be error in the receipt of evidence or in the findings
or issuance of the order, that such order should be void
and of no effect at all. The contrary is conclusively indicated by such statute. It cannot be argued in the face of
such a statute that the I.C.C. in any \Yay exceeded the
power or authority granted to it by law in holding the
hearing, making findings and issuing the orders as issued
herein. (Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 12)
In the case at bar the order of the I.C.C. (Exhibit 10)
and tariffs thereunder (Exhibit 4) took effect and remained in effect until set aside by the court's order.
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In addition to the provisions of Section 15 ahove
referred to, which provides that the Commission's order
under s()etion 13 shall take effect and continue in force
until modified or suspended by the Commission itself or
by a court of competent jurisdiction, Section 16 of the
Act is headed ''Orders of Commission and Enforcement
Thereof." It refers to what should be done "after hearing on a complaint made as provided in Section 13 of
this part'' and provides :
"Section 16 (7). It shall be the duty of every
common carrier, its agents and employes, to observe and comply with such orders so long as the
same shall remain in effect.''
Subparagraph 8 of the same section then goes on
to provide a penalty of $5,000 for each offense, stating
that each day shall be deemed a separate offense, and then
follow provisions providing for the enforcement of penalty provisions by the Attorney General of the United
States and various United States District attorneys.
It will thus be seen that a provision has been made
in the statute itself for the eventuality of the setting aside
of these I.C.C. orders but it requires that they shall remain in effect until so set aside, and carriers and others
are compelled to comply strictly therewith so long as they
are so in force or be subject to extreme penalties. As so
stated by Justice Cardoza in Atlantic Coast Line v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 79 L.Ed. 14:51, 55 S. Ct. 713:
"The carrier was not at liberty to take the
la'v into its own hands and refuse submission to
the order " . ithout the sanction of the court. It
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\vould have exposed itself to suits and penalties,
both criminal and civil, if it had followed such
path. See e.g. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.,
sec. 16 (8), (9), (10), (11). Obedience was owing
while the order was in force.''
On page 13 of appellant's brief counsel refers to the
case of North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507,
89 L.Ed. 1760, 65 S. Ct. 1260, and. again confuses the
terms ''jurisdiction'' and ''justification'' and italicizes
a quotation in that case from Florida v. United States,
282 U.S. 194, wherein Chief Justice Hughes says that
before the I.C.C. can nullify a state rate, justification
for the ''exercise of federal power must clearly appear.''
It will be noted that Chief Justice Hughes did not say
''jurisdiction'' must be shown but said that ''justification
for the exercise" of power or jurisdiction must appear.
There is a distinction between jurisdiction to act and
justifica.tion for the exercise of that jurisdiction and that is
what makes a difference between orders or judgments
which will be "void" for want of jurisdiction, or "voidable'' because of error in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
Both the North Carolina case and the recent opinion
of the United States Supreme Court in 356 U.S. 421 refer
to the fact that the evidence must meet a ''high standard
of certainty.'' If there is no ''jurisdiction,'' then the
question of evidence becomes immaterial. If there is jurisdiction, then we would ask: When, during the course of
presentation of evidence, \Yould a court or commission
lose jurisdiction because the evidence does not meet the
high standard of certainty 1 If the evidence is insufficient
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after it is all in, then the court or commission errs in
issuing a judgment or order. But such is error making
the judgment or order voidable and giving a basis for
setting it aside on appeal and does not make the entire
proceedings void.
In the very case last referred to and quoted from,
Chief Justice Hughes said (282 U.S. at page 211):
''The question in the present cases then is not
one of authority but of its appropriate exercise. * • •"
In reversing the lower court and setting the I.C.C.
order aside, the United States Supreme Court in Public
Service Com. of Utah v. United States, 356 U.S. 421, 2
L.Ed. 2d 886, 78 S. Ct. 796, concluded as follows (page
429):
''The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court
with instructions to set aside the order of the Commission and remand the cause to the Commission
for further proceedings in conformity with this
opinion.''
Counsel for appellants argue that in view of that
court's decision the ''jurisdiction'' of the I. C. C. failed
and it had no further power to do anything. In other
words, it is counsel's position, and he has at all prior
stages in this proceeding argued, that the I.C.C. had no
power to do anything save to dismiss the proceeding.
Why then, we will ask, would the Supreme Court direct
that the matter be remanded to the I.C.C. ''for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion"~ The Supreme Court was not directing a useless thing, but it was
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sending the matter back to the I.C.C. in the self-same pro ..
ceeding in which the I.C.C. had originally acted, to give
the I.C.C. an opportunity to correct any errors and give
proper validity to the order which the Court had thus set
aside because of errors in the proceedings.
In Erie R. Co. v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 162, a
three-judge federal court had before it an order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to rates,
and in that case the argument was advanced as by plaintiff's counsel here, that the original order was void and
on remand the I.C.C. had no authority but to dismiss. In
that case reference was made to Section 15 (2) of the
Interstate Commerce Act, providing that such order
should take effect and remain in effect ''unless the same
shall be suspended or set aside by a court of competent
jurisdiction.'' On the point of authority of the Commission to further proceed, it was argued, ''Since this court
set aside the Commission's order the plaintiffs contend
that the Commission had no authority to proceed in the
case.''
To this argument the three-judge federal court
answered:
''We think this contention .has no merit. The
statute specifically provides that the Commission
is authorized to 'suspend or modify its orders upon
such notice and in such manner as it shall deem
proper.' Section 16 (6). This provision invests
the Commission with a con-tinuing jurisdiction, and
the provision in Section 15 (2) above quoted does
not create nor contenzplate amy linz itation upon
the cont·inuing jurisdiction. It provides that after
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an order of the Commission is suspended or set
aside by a court, it is no longer effectiYe. But
neither expressly nor by necessary implication
does it provide that after the court has set aside
one of its orders the Commission can take no further action with reference to the subject matter of
the order. In this case the construction contended
for would result in the absurd conclusion that when
a court has determined that the Commission erred
in issuing an order not based on evidence the
Commission is not empowered to acquiesce in the
court's ruling and to re-open the case for the taking of evidence. Such a result is neither required
nor authorized by the statute.
1

''We are strengthened in this conclusion by the
fact that the Supreme Court has sustained the action of the Commission in instances where an order
has been set aside because of inadequate findings
and thereafter the Commission has heard additional evidence and made additional findings.
(Cases Cited)
''We conclude that the Commission was clearly
authorized to proceed with the rehearing in this
case.''
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently had
occasion to reverse an order of its State Commission
with respect to increases in freight rates similar to the
matter involved here. The matter was sent back for further proceedings to the State Commission, and after further hearing the Commission issued the same order as
issued before, which was then approved by the Supreme
Court. It was argued that the new order involved retroactive rate making, which the Commission could not do.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina did not agree 'vith
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such contention and characterized its pnor decision
remanding the case, saying such opinion ''as interpreted
by this court had the effect of remanding this cause to the
Commission for further hearings; this being a continuation of the same cause, the principle of res judicata and
the rule of law which forbids retroactive rate making are
not applicable to the order of the Commission under
review by this court.'' See State of North Carolina v. Department of Agriculture, 109 S.E. 2d 368 at 374. (June 12,
1959)
We confidently assert that counsel for appellant is
urging an erroneous position when he argues that the
action of the Supreme Court in setting aside the I.C.C.
orders was equivalent to a decision that such order was
void. Not only is counsel in error in so assuming, but
he makes no attempt to cite authorities to sustain such a
proposition. We have already pointed out that the fact
that the Supreme Court remanded the matter for further
proceedings indicates that they did not hold the order
void but sent it back to allow the I. C. C. to correct the evidentiary deficiencies if possible.
The Supreme Court of the United States has itself
on more than one occasion held that remand of a case
as was done in this instance does not terminate the right
of the inferior tribunal to proceed further and does not
make either the prior or subsequent proceedings void.
The I.C.C. itself on pages 4 and 5 of its last report (Exhibit 11) so answers counsel on the same argument made
by him before that body.
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In the case of Serurities & Exchange Conunissiou v.
Chenery Gorp., 322 U.S. 194, 91 L.Ed. 1955, 67 S. Ct. 157r>,
the United States Supreme Court, referring to such a
remand, stated at page 250:
''This obviously meant something more than
the entry of a perfunctory order.''
Also, in the case of Ford Motor Co. v. Labor Board,
305 U.S. 364, 83 L.Ed. 221, 59 S. Ct. 301, the Supreme
Court stated at page 37 4 :
''Such a remand does not dismiss or terminate
the administrative proceeding. If findings are lacking which may properly be made on the evidence
already received, the court does not require the
evidence to be reheard. • • • If further evidence
is necessary and available to supply the bases for
findings on material points, that evidence may be
taken. • • •. ''
As is stated by appellants on page 16 of their brief,
the railroads do place considerable reliance upon the
case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S.
301, 79 L.Ed. 1451, 55 S. Ct. 713. Counsel then says that
such case is ''basically entirely different.'' The only
"basic" difference which counsel even attempts to point
out is the question as to whether jurisdiction to hear the
present controversy should be in the state court or the
federal court. It is not a question of "jurisdiction" of
the I. C. C., and the question of "jurisdiction" to hear the
matter no"'" before this court is outside the issues of this
case. As far as this court is concerned, it has jurisdiction to hear the matter presently before it. In the Florida
case the matter of restitution was heard before the federal
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court, where there was ''conceded jurisdiction.'' No question at all was raised there as to whether the matter
should be heard in the federal or in the state court, but
that in no manner distinguishes or makes "basically different'' the right or absence of a right on the part of the
plaintiffs to have restitution in this case. In fact, in the
Structural Steel case to which counsel for appellants likes
to refer, the Circuit Court stated that even if it should
be finally determined that the rates in question were
"unsupported by any valid order," that in such event
''the right to prevail would depend upon traditional notions of equity as in Atlantic Coast Lines v. Florida, 295
u.s. 301."
The report of litigation involved in the Atlantic Coast
LineR. Co. v. Florida cases is much too long to make more
than very brief reference to here, but we do commend
the court to a study of the various proceedings involved
in that case, a study and analysis of which will show a
complete parallel with the situation now involved before
this court. That case went to the United States Supreme
Court three times. In the first hearing the I.C.C. concluded that intrastate rates discriminated against interstate commerce and ordered intrastate rates increased.
A three-judge federal court sustained the order, but, on
appeal, the United States Supreme Court held the findings insufficient to support the Commission's order and
set the order aside. Florida v. United States, 282 U.S.
194, 75 L.Ed. 291, 51 S. Ct. 119. On remand the I.C.C.
re-opened the proceedings and, after full hearing, issued
another order, again requiring said intrastate rates to
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be increased. A three-judge court aga1n sustained the
order, and, on a second appeal, the United States Supreme
Court sustained such second order. Florida v. [/nifed
A~ fates, ~9~ U.S. 1., 78 L.Ed. 1077, 54 S. Ct. 603. Chief
Justice Hughes was the 'vriter of the opinion in each of
these two appeals.
1

During a period of two years after the original I. C. C.
order and before its reversal by the Supreme Court on
the first appeal, the railroads had collected the increased
rates. After the reversal the shippers who had intervened
in the federal district court proceedings petitioned that
court for a decree requiring the railroads to repay the
increases so paid. The matter was referred to a master,
who recommended restitution of only part of the increases, on the basis that the original state rates had been
too low. The three-judge court affirmed his report and
recommendation and both parties appealed.
The Supreme Court sustained the last order of the
Commission, reversed the holding of the court and the
master with respect to repayment of part of the increases
collected, held tha_t the orders of the Commission were not
void and that the shippers were not entitled to restitution
of any of the amounts so paid. The court, speaking
through Justice Cardoza, said (_.A.tlantic Coast Line v.
Florida, 295 U.S. 301 at 310, 79 L.Ed. 1451, 55 S. Ct. 713) :
'' * • • 'Restitution is not of mere right. It is
ex gratia, resting in the exercise of a sound discretion, and the court will not order it where the
justice of the case does not call for it, nor where
. se t as1"d e f or a mere s1·1p. ' * * * 'In
the process IS
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such cases the simple but comprehensive question
is whether the circumstances are such that equitably the defendant should restore to the plaintiff
what he has received' * * *"

'' * * *. An order declaring the discrimination
to be excessive and unjust was made by the Commission before the carrier attempted to collect
the higher charges. Thereafter the order was adjudged void by a decision of this court • • * but
void solely upon the ground that the facts supporting the conclusion were not embodied in the
findings. Void in such a context is the equivalent
of voidable. * • * The carrier was not at liberty
to take the law into its own hands and refuse submission to the order without the sanction of a
court. It would have exposed itself to suits and
penalties, both criminal and civil, if it had followed
such a path. See e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. sec. 16 (8) (9) (10) (11). Obedience was
owing while the order was in force.
''By the time that the claim for restitution had
been heard by the master and passed upon by the
reviewing court, the Commission had cured the
defects in the form of its earlier decision. During
the years affected by the claim there existed in
very truth the unjust discrimination against interstate commerce that the earlier decision had attempted to correct. If the processes of the law
had been instantaneous or adequate, the attempt
at correction would not have missed the mark. It
was foiled through imperfections of form, through
slips of procedure * * *, as the sequel of events
has shown them to be. Unjust discrimination
against interstate commerce, 'forbidden' by the
statute, and there 'declared to be unlawful.' * * •
does not lose its unjust quality because the evil is
without a remedy until the Commission shall have
spoken. The word ""'hen it goes forth inYested with
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the forms of law may fix the consequences to be
attributed to the conduct of the carrier in reliance
upon an earlier word, defectiYcly pronounced, but
aimed at the self-same evil, there from the beginning. rrhe Commission was without power to give
reparation for the injustice of the past, but it was
not \\·ithout power to inquire whether injustice had
been done and to make report accordingly. Indeed,
without such an inquiry and appropriate evidence
and findings, its order could not stand, though directed to the years to come. Obedient to this duty,
the Commission looked into the past and ascertained the facts. In particular it looked into the
very years covered by the claims for restitution
and found the inequality and injustice inherent in
the Cummer rates during the years they were in
suspense and during those they were in force.

• * •. What it had stated in its first report • • •
was thus supplemented and confirmed by what it
stated in the second. The two sets of findings tell
us, when read together, that restitution is without support in equity and conscience, whatever
support may come to it from procedural entanglements."
We confidently urge upon the court that this Florida
case, on its facts, is a close parallel to the case at bar and
ample precedent and authority to guide the court herein.
If more were needed, 'Ye could cite a number of cases
"?herein the Florida case has been followed on the point
of restitution, " . herein the courts have held that it is
allowable only upon an equitable basis.
Counsel for appellants, at page 17 of his brief, tries
to distinguish this Atlanfi.c Coast Line case by saying:
''There was no holding of any lack of evidence to give
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rise to the federal jurisdiction'' and again, page 20, where
he says the defect in that case was in the findings and
"not in the evidence." Lack of evidence or lack of findings would, either one, affect only the merits and not
jurisdiction or power to act. However, counsel does not
read the Atla;ntic Coast Line case closely enough. On the
first appeal the court, through Chief Justice Hughes, said
( 282, at page 215) :
'' * * * The Commission is the fact finding
body and the court examines the evidence not to
make findings for the Commission but to ascertain whether its findings are properly supported. * * *.''

If there are not adequate findings, the court does not
go further to examine the evidence. As was said by Justice Cardoza in 295 U.S. at 306, further quoting from the
prior opinion by Chief Justice Hughes:
''In the absence of such findings we are not
called upon to examine the evidence in order to
resolve opposing conditions as to what it
shows. * * *. ' '
Regardless of what the evidence may have been on
the first hearing, on the final appeal Justice Cardoza
states (295 U.S. at 307) :

'' * * * After the mandate of reversal the Interstate Commerce Commission listened to new
evidence, made a new set of findings and prescribed the same rate that it had put into effect
before * * * and * * * both the findings of the
Commission and the evidence back of the findings
were now held to be sufficient.''
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(~ounsel

on page 19 of appellant's brief, referring to
the ~ceond report and order of the I.C.(1 • in the rase at bar
(Exhibits 11 and 12) said:'' They do not make any attempt
to make either their order or their findings retroactive.''
NPither did the Commission in the Florida case, but in
both eases the second report and order referred to periods
of time covered by the first order.
A case involving another federal agency but "'"hich
followed interstate commerce law and procedure, is
]forgan v. Un.ited States, which case the United States
Supreme Court had occasion to have before it four times,
the first time at 298 U.S. 468, 80 L.Ed. 1288, 56 S. Ct. 906.
The la\v prescribing powers of the Secretary of Agriculture in setting rates to be charged by market agencies
\\'"as similar to provisions of the Interstate Commerce
. \rt. The law provided that on complaint or request the
Secretary of Agriculture should investigate the rates
charged, and if, after a full hearing, he found questioned
rates to be unreasonable or discriminatory, he should prescribe reasonable rates thereafter to be charged. Under
this law the Secretary of Agriculture did undertake
an investigation into the reasonableness of existing rates
and issued an order prescribing maximum rates thereafter to be charged, which maximum rates \vere lower
than existing rates.
The la\v governing procedural matters provided that
in proceedings undertaken by the Secretary of Agriculture and with respect to orders issued by him, the pro-
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visions of all laws relating to "enforcing," "suspending," or "setting aside" orders of the I. C. C. would be
applicable. It was under such laws that the order was
attacked before a three-judge federal court. The threejudge court issued its decree sustaining the Secretary's
order, but on appeal the United States Supreme Court
reversed. In the original complaint before the three-judge
court it was alleged that no proper or full hearing had
been held, but the court, on motion of the government
attorneys, struck out such allegations and the government
was not required to answer them, and the district court
took no evidence on the question as to whether or not a
full hearing had been accorded. On this basis the Supreme Court reversed, saying the district court erred in
striking the allegations re lack of a full hearing; - that
on that point the government should be required to answer
and the court take evidence - and the Supreme Court
said:
''The decree is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity
with this opinion. ' '
On rehearing the three-judge court took evidence with
respect to the manner in which the Secretary had conducted the investigation and the type of hearing that had
been held and again sustained the Secretary's order.
On a second appeal, 1V.l organ v. U11ited States, 304 U.S. 1,
82 L.Ed. 1129, 58 S. Ct. 773, the Supreme Court discussed
the requisites for a full hearing and concluded that a full
hearing had not been given before the Secretary. It again
reversed the district court and remanded the matter "for
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further proceedings 1n conformity with our opinion.''
(304 u.s. 26)
As was later referred to by the Supreme Court, the
order of the Secretary at this time was set aside without
consideration on the merits but solely for failure of the
Secretary to follow the procedure prescribed by the statute. (See 307 U.S. 185.)
In the meantime, while the matters were pending
before the Supreme Court and before the matter got back
to the Secretary for further hearing, monies representing
charges in excess of the rates prescribed by the Secretary's order were being impounded with the district
court.
On remand after the second appeal the Secretary of
Agriculture re-opened the original proceedings for further hearings. He served his findings in the investigation upon the market agencies and gave them a time limit
in which to file exceptions and have oral arguments on
such exceptions to his findings. The market agencies declined to join further in the original proceedings as reopened and made a motion before the three-judge court to
distribute the impounded monies among them. The Secretary and government attorneys moved for a stay to
await the outcome of further proceedings before the Secretary. The three-judge court denied the stay and thereupon entered a decree setting aside the Scretary's order,
permanently enjoined its enforcement and directed that
the impounded monies be distributed among the market
agencies. From such decrees of the three-judge court the
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government and the Secretary brought the third appeal
to the Supreme Court. See United States v. Morgan,
307 U.S. 183, 83 L.Ed. 1211, 59 S. Ct. 795. The original
order of the Secretary was dated June 14, 1933, and this
third appeal got to the Supreme Court in October, 1938.
The basis of the district court's order distributing
the impounded funds was that the Secretary of Agriculture could not now by further order prescribe rates and
make them effective as of June, 1933, the date of his original order and the start of the impounding of the monies.
This issue brought the question of the merits of the Secretary's decision before the Supreme Court for the first
time.
This time the Supreme Court sustained the Secretary's order. The court referred to the fact that the
law required that all such rates be "just, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory," and that even if it be conceded that
the Secretary might not now make a retroactive rate
order, "* * * he was free to make an order fixing rates
for the future and for that purpose or any other within
the purview of the Act he is now free to determine a
reasonable rate for the period antedating any order he
may now make." (Page 192) (Citing _A_tlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 312)
The court at page 195 referred to Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Florida, saying," This court" in that case "'vent
1nuch further'' and then added re the Florida case :
"The final result of the litigation 'vas that the
railroads 'vere permitted to collect and retain the
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higher rates for a period during which there was
no la,vful order of the Commission superseding
the state C'ommission rates. * * * But t h r re as
here the lirst administratiue order u:as not a
unllity. *
* Though voidable it could not be ignored \vithout incurring the penalties for disobedience inflicted by the applicable provisions of the
statute. The rates did not lose their unjust and
unreasonable quality in the one case, or cease to be
unjustly discriminatory in the other, merely because the administrative orders in each \vere voidable for procedural defects or because a second
order could operate only for the future. * * * ''
o)!:

The Court reversed the district court for the third
time and ordered the impounded funds held until the Secretary had completed his further proceedings.
The Secretary proceeded with further hearing and
used his earlier findings ''as a working basis'' for a further hearing. But he took new evidence and gave the
market agencies the opportunity of offering any evidence
they desired. After his final order the three-judge court,
by a two to one decision, set the order aside and again
directed the monies impounded to be returned to the market agencies. On a fourth and final appeal, the United
States Supreme Court again reversed and upheld the Secretary's order as it affected the rate from June, 1933,
for"'"ard and refused to order the moneys to be refunded.
See [Tn.ited States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 85 L.Ed. 1429,
61 S. Ct. 999.
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POINT TWO
THE TARIFFS CHARGED AND COLLECTED BY THE DEFENDANT RAILROADS DURING THE PERIOD IN QUESTION WERE EFFECTIVELY "FILED"
AND WERE THE TARIFFS ''ON FILE AND
IN EFFECT'' AND HAD TO BE COMPLIED
WITH UNDER BOTH FEDERAL AND
UTAH STATE LAW.
Under his Point Four, counsel for appellant argues
that the "mailing" of the tariffs to the P.S.C.U. was not
a ''filing'' of the tariffs. We will ask, how are tariffs normally filed and what was done and not done in filing the
tariffs in question which should have been done~
Plaintiffs produced as their witness Keith E. Sohm,
Commerce Attorney and head of the Rate and Tariff Department of the P.S.C.U. (R. 54) He identified the master tariffs of increased rates under Ex Parte 175, (R. 57)
and the several tariffs produced by him included a number of supplements which had been filed. Included in these
supplements was a sheet designated as "K-19" (Page 14
of Exhibit 4), concerning which he said (R. 58): "The
particular supplement which was filed to make effective
in Utah certain rates is called K-19, I believe.'' Even
plaintiff's counsel's question asked: ''These are the copies of the tariffs filed pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Commission order 'vi th your Commission~''
( R. 38) To which Mr. S.ohm answered, ''Correct.''
(R. 59) The original Ex Parte 175 tariffs were not in-
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tended to become effective on Utah intrastate traffic until
a subsequent supplement was published. ''That subsequent supplement is called K-19. It was stamped received
on June 21, 1956. It \vas stamped filed on June 21, 1956.
It ~tates an effective date of June 22, 1956." (R. 59)
With respect to ''mailing" or "filing" no distinction
is made by the P.S.C.U. between tariffs filed for "information'' and ''effective tariffs.'' These tariffs - including the supplement l(-19- were ''made a part of our
regular file and all of the tariffs were put together. There
\vas no distinction in the handling of this tariff and
other regular tariffs.'' ( R. 65)
With respect to supplement K-19 Mr. Sohm said:
"As far as I know it was filed with our commission and
the increases were charged.'' ( R. 66)
Appellant's counsel tries to make a point of the fact
that the P .S.C. U. issued no orders approving such tariffs,
but l\[r. Sohm said he knew of no instance when the
P.S.C.U. had ever issued any order approving tariffs
\vhich had been filed pursuant to I.C.C. order. (R. 66)
The l{-19 supplement was similar to numerous tariffs
and supplements filed with the P.S.C.U. almost daily'' and
by such filing become effective to control the transportation of Utah intrastate traffic if they affect you in intrastate traffic as K-19 did?" Answer: "Yes." (R. 68)

~Ir.

Sohm further testified that the railroads ''published a
successive supplement which * • • cancels supplement
l(-19." (R. 6) Tariff "Supplement K-36" (Sheet 2 of
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Exhibit 4) ''is the supplement which took the effectiveness of the Ex Parte 175 increases out of effect." (R. 74)
Mr. Sohm also testified (R. 79): "Were these rates
that were made effective under the supplement K-19 such
that the railroads could not have lowered or charged less
on any freight affected by that without authority either
from the Public Service Commission or the Interstate
Commerce Commission 1'' Answer : ''I believe that is
true. * * *."
We would here pose the question: Suppose the
I.C.C. order had not been set aside, what then would have
been the result of this filing 1 There would then have
been no possible question as to the propriety and effectiveness of the filing of such rates and no further filing
would have been necessary. The controlling issue, then, is
what was the effect of the Supreme Court's decision setting the I. C. C. order aside 1 Did it make such order and
everything done under it void ad initio or only voidable,
so that it should be set aside as was done by the Supreme
Court and sent back for further proceedings' This action
of the Supreme Court was like a reversal for insufficient
evidence in a court of law where a matter is sent back for
a new trial, and on the ne'v trial, if proper evidence is
produced, the original judgment or a subsequent one
identical in terms may be supported and affirmed.
Respondents respectfully urge that under the circumstances here shown the increased tariffs were the ''tariffs
on file and in effect at the time" and had to be complied
with under both state and federal law.
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lTtah Code Annotated, :l4-3-2 (1). "Every common
carrier shall file with the Co1nmission * * * schedules
showing- the rate~, fares and charges * * * for transportation. * * *"
U.C.A. 54-3-6 (1) provides that no common carrier
shall engage in transportation within the state until its
schedules shall have been filed and published, and then
provides in subparagraph (2):
''No common carrier shall charge * * * a
greater or less or different compensation for * * *
transportation * * * than the rates and fares * * *
as specified in its schedules filed and in effect at
the time; nor shall any carrier refund or limit* * *
any portion of the rates, fares or charges so specified except upon order of the Commission as hereinafter provided. * * * ''

U. C. A. 54-3-7:
''No public utility shall charge, demand, collect
or receive a greater or less or different compensation * * * than the rates * * * and charges a pplicable to such * * * service as specified in its
schedules on file and in effect at the time."
U. C. A. 54-3-11 prohibits rebates and says carriers
must not allo'\v any transportation ''at less than the rates
and fares then established and in force as shotcn by the
schedules filed and in effect at the time."

From these statutes it is clear that filed tariffs have
the force of la'\v and must be complied \vith until or unless
suspended or changed. See Keogh v. C. & N. TV. R. Co.,
260 U.S. 156, 67 L.Ed. 183, 43 S. Ct. 47.
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We are mindful of U.C.A. 54-7-12, referred to by
appellant's counsel, which provides that no utility may
raise any rate except upon a showing before and finding
by the Commission. That provision is contained in subparagraph (1). But what if such rates are :filed~ What is
the purpose of subparagraph (2) of U.C.A. 54-7-12, which
says that whenever any tariff is filed ''increasing or resulting in any increase in any rate" the Commission may
''enter upon a hearing concerning the propriety of such
rate''~ During the period of investigation the Commission may suspend the effectiveness of such rate up to six
months. The statute does not say such filed rate making
an increase is or should be considered a nullity. This
very definitely shows the legislative intent that the publishing and filing of a rate was intended to make such
rate effective and applicable. If done by order of the
Commission after a hearing, clearly the Commission
would have no basis for suspending and entering upon a
hearing concerning its propriety. It has been held that
rates which have been published and filed containing a
mistake nevertheless are considered binding and an increased rate so contained in a filed tariff by mistake must
be paid and then application can be made for reparations
with respect to it. See Louisville Ceme,nt Co. v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 246 U.S. 638, 62 L.Ed. 914, 38
S. Ct. 408.
The scheme of the entire Utah Public Utilities Act,
\vhich is very comprehensive, contemplates that rates may
be set by Commission order or may be set by a Yoluntary
filing by a carrier, in \Yhich latter event the Commis-
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sion may suspPnd and hold an investigative hearing. But
a filed rate is considered to have the force of law until
suspended, cancelled or set aside, and extreme penalties
are provided by both state and federal law for disregarding such filed tariffs. See statement by Justice Cardoza
in Atlantic Coast Line v. Florida, 295 U.S. at 311.

POINT THREE
THE FURTHER FINDINGS AND REPORT
OF THE I.C.C. OF DECEMBER, 1959 SUPPLEMENT AND SUPPORT THE ORIGINAL
FINDINGS ON WHICH THE OI~DER OF
FEBRUARY 8, 1956, WAS BASED AND DETAIL EVIDENCE WHICH THE SUPRE:\lE
COURT SAID WAS LACKING.
Counsel for appellants, in arguing under his Point
Five, at page 26, again tries to distinguish the Atlantic
Coast Line case by saying that in that case the I.C.C.
"merely corrected the defective findings in the original
order." Justice Cardoza in that case makes two references to this point. At the beginning of his opinion he
said that the I.C.C., ''upon new evidence and new findings,
made the same order it had made before." (295 U.S. 305)
Again, at page 307, he says, ''After the mandate of reYersal the Interstate Commerce Commission listened to
new evidence, made a new set of findings and prescribed
the same rate that it had put into effect before." We ask,
ho'v can counsel, or anyone else, distinguish that from
the case at bar 1
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On page 26 appellant's brief also intimates that the
I.C.C. in the second report and order (Exhibits 11 and 12)
does not purport to cover any of the conditions existing
prior to its first order, and he refers to findings on pages
25 to 29 of Exhibit 11, saying,'' They make no reference to
conditions existing prior to December 7, 1959. '' Why
should counsel limit reference to pages 25 to 29 ~ The first
25 pages of the report (Exhibit 11) were intended by the
Commission to have some effect in detailing the evidence
which they considered and what it showed. The I.C.C.
again did just as Justice Cardoza in the Atlantic Coast
Line v. Florida case, 295 U. S. at 312, said that the I.C.C.
did in that case : '' * * * in particular it looked into the
very years covered by the claims for restitution and
found the inequality inherent in the Cummer rates during
the years they were in suspense and during those they
were in force. * * * What it had stated in its first report
* * * was thus supplemented and confirmed by "~hat is
stated in the second. * * *. '' In the case at bar (Exhibit
11, page 5) the I. C. C. states: "The evidence on further
hearing, for the most part covers the entire period within
which the Ex Parte Nos. 175, 196 and 206 increases became applicable on intrastate rates. To avoid duplication of discussion as much as possible, the evidence generally will be considered as a whole. * * * Data for 1954
will indicate the situation 'vith respect to the increase in
Ex Parte 175 and (data for) 1956 and 1957 with respect to
Ex Parte 196 and 206 increases. ' '
For the next several pages the Commission then goes
on to detail evidence coYering the entire period, both
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hPfore the ordvr of February, 1956 as well as subsequent
thereto, and this continues from pages 6 to 1;j, inclusive.
In some places comparisons are made with averages of
1~);{;> to 1939, and in some places with averages of 1947
to 1~)-l-9. On page 7 the increases in railroad material
costs and \vages from 1939 up to 1954 were shown, coYPring the period prior to the first order; also, material
costs and wage increases as further increased by 1956.
1\t the same time, comparative increases in freight rates
up to 1954, and again also to 1956, were shown~ also,
farmers' prices, wholesale prices, consumers' prices and
per capita income payments as they had increased over
previous base period up to 1954, which would cover a
period included in the first order, and also further inereases up to 1956 which would be involved in Ex Parte
196 and 206. At pages 10 to 12 it referred to main line
and branch line grades and curvatures, showing steeper
grades and excess curvatures on branch lines; also, wages
and overtime, showing higher wages and more O\?ertime
paid on branch lines, where the majority of the intrastate
traffic moved. These all affected the period prior to the
order of 1956 as well as giving figures for the additional
years of 1956 and 1957.
The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the
prior order, mentioned and placed considerable reliance
upon density figures and operating ratios, referring to
eYidence \vhich had been introduced by plaintiffs as
protestants in that prior case (356 U.S. at 426).
In the prior hearing evidence as to density and ratios
had been introduced in an exhibit prepared by the Public
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Service Commission of Utah, attempting to sho"\Y a comparison between density of intrastate traffic and densi1 y
of interstate traffic on the theory that where the greatPr
amount of traffic moves, the overall costs are spread
thinner. Admittedly, the figures introduced at that time
included some interstate traffic, and the railroads did not
introduce actual figures showing only intrastate density.
On the rehearing the railroads did introduce actual density figures and very definitely proved - in fact, the
P.S.C.U. Auditor admitted- that the "intrastate'' density figures which they had used included not only intrastate traffic, which would be traffic moving wholly within
Utah, but also included all traffic originating in Utah and
moving out, all traffic originating outside and moving into
Utah, and all traffic neither originating nor terminating
in Utah, but which moved across Utah and which is
termed "bridge" or "overhead" traffic. For their interstate figures they used railroad system statistics outside
of Utah. Upon the further hearing after remand from
the federal court, to counteract this, the railroads introduced actual figures showing what was purely Utah intrastate traffic and what was actually interstate traffic
already bearing higher rates. The very years - 1953 and
1954- which were included in the P.S.C.U. exhibit in the
prior hearing, showing the evidence upon which the
United States Supreme Court relied, were again covered;
and the actual figures show interstate traffic density to
be at least three times that of intrastate traffic density.
Similar actual density figures 'vere also sho,vn for the
years 1956 and 1957. The I.C.C. referred in detail to
these figures on pages 13 and 14 of the Exhibit 11 and
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<'Oll<'lnded that all of such figures, both with respect to the
yPars prior as well as after the order of February, 1956,
show" thP more favorable density of the interstate traffic
compared with the intrastate traffic." The I. C. C. also, at
thP bottom of page 14 of Exhibit 11, refers to the density
figures as produced by the protestants (plaintiffs) and
definitely state that the value of such evidence \\~as "impaired'' because it included "heavy overhead movement,''
\\~hich \vas all interstate and not proper in intrastate figures at all. It will thus be seen that not only did the
I. C. C. ''make reference to conditions existing prior to
December 7, 1959," but referred to the very evidence that
applied to the points which the Supreme Court said \vas
lacking in its prior order, to show the facts which existed
at the time of and previous to that prior order, as well as
to show that such facts continued to exist as of the date of
its last order (Exhibit 11). Here again we say that this
shows a parallel to the Atlantic Coast Line case and the
decision of the court in that case should be controlling
here because, as in that case so also in this, the I.C.C.
''looked into the very years covered by the claims for restitution and found the inequality and injustice'' still to
exist and "what it had stated in its first report * * *
\vas thus supplemented and confirmed by \vhat it stated
in the second.''
POINT FOUR
~\PPLIC.A_TION

TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH FOR REP ARATIONS IS A PREREQUISITE TO ANY
RIGHT OF REP~\R~\TION OR RESTITU-
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TION, REGARDLESS OF THE EFFECT OF
ANY I.C.C. ORDER.
Counsel for appellant in his brief admits the statutory provision concerning reparation but tries to argue
against its application by saying that the permissive word
''may'' is used, and says, ''Suppose the Commission does
not want to take jurisdiction.'' We think that such an
argument has no merit whatsoever. By comparison we
refer to Utah Code Annotated, 54-4-1, which says that
the Commission is vested with power and jurisdiction to
supervise and regulate every public utility in the state.
This again is a statement that the Commission has been
granted the power to do certain things but does not directly say that they have the obligation to exercise that
power. Would counsel, with respect to such provisions,
say, ''Suppose the Commission does not want to regulate
a public utility.'' Could we say that it does not have to
under the law1
He argues that the statute is silent on the question
of whether or not the statutory remedy is exclusive. The
statute is broad, and with such broad coverage provides
numerous remedies without reserving the common law
remedy. The concluding sentence of sec. 54-7-20 reads:
''The remedy in this section provided shall be
cumulative and in addition to any other remedy or
remedies under this title in case of failure of a
public utility to obey an order or decision of the
Commission.''
The limiting of remedies to those "under this title"
shows the intent of the framers of the statute to lodge the
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exelusive pO\\.t'r to determine the right to reparations in
the Commission, 'vith the right then to go to any court of
eompetent jurisdiction to enforce the reparation order.
\\'" e think such would be a situation where the maxim
"·ould apply "'inc[ usia unius est e.rclusio alterius." With
such a broad coverage in the statute, if it had been the
intent of the legislators to preserve the common la'v
rPmedy, we think they would have so stated; but the Utah
i\et was passed within approximately ten years after
issuance from the Supreme Court of its decision in the
case of Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,
"·hich will be referred to presently and which construed
the Interstate Commerce Act with respect to such a
matter.
It is admitted that in absence of a statute which may
be controlling there was a right at common law to recover
against a carrier who had exacted unreasonable or exorbitaut rates from a shipper. In order to so recover it was
necessary for the shipper to plead and prove, and for the
court to adjudge, that the rates which had been exacted
'vere unreasonable. Plaintiffs never attempted such in
the case at bar.
With the enacting of the Interstate Commerce Act
and the numerous public service commission acts in the
Yarious states, it has been held generally that these acts
supersede the right at common law as far as any common
la"· right of recovery is concerned. There are one or two
exceptions, but the jurisdictions so holding are in the
minority and are based upon specific statutory provisions
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saying that the common law remedy is retained or still
available, or words of some similar purport. The Interstate Commerce Act itself provided:
''Nothing in this Act contained shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at
common law or by statute, but the provisions of
this Act are in addition to such remedies.''
In spite of that provision, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in a case now considered a landmark case
and cited and followed extensively, Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 51 L.Ed. 553, 27 S.
Ct. 350, held that such provision was so repugnant to the
other provisions and purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act to require uniformity in rates, that it could not
stand in the face of other provisions, and the rule established in that case has since been followed - that the
Interstate Commerce Act superseded and abolished all
common law remedies with respect to reparations as far
as interstate rates were concerned.
In referring to the provisions and purposes of the
Interstate Commerce Act, the Supreme Court in the
Abilene case said at page 437:
''The act made it the duty of carriers subject to
its provisions to charge only just and reasonable
rates. To that end the duty was imposed of establishing and publishing schedules of such rates.
It forbade all unjust preferences and discriminations, made it unlawful to depart from the rates
in the established schedules until the same were
changed as authorized by the act, and such departure was made an offense punishable by fine or
imprisonment, or both, and the prohibitions of
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the art and the punishments which it imposed "·ere
directed not only against carriers but against
shippers, or any person \vho, directly or indirectly, by any machination or device in any
manner \vhatsoever, accomplished the result of
producing the wrongful discriminations or preferences which the act forbade. It was made the duty
of carriers subject to the act to file with the Interstate Commerce Commission created by that
act copies of established schedules, and power
was conferred upon that body to provide as to
the form of the schedules, and penalties were imposed for not establishing and filing the required
schedules. The Commission was endowed with
plenary administrative power to supervise the
conduct of carriers, to investigate their affairs,
their accounts and their methods of dealing, and
generally to enforce the provisions of the act.

* * * Power was conferred upon the Commission to hear complaints concerning violations of
the act, to investigate the same, and if the complaints were well founded, to direct not only the
making of reparation to the injured persons, but
to order the carrier to desist from such violation
in the future. In the event of the failure of a
carrier to obey the order of the Commission that
body, or the party in whose favor an award of
reparation was made, was empowered to compel
compliance by invoking the authority of the courts
of the United States in the manner pointed out in
the statute, prima facie effect in such courts
being given to the findings of fact made by the
Commission.''
It is apparent that the Public Utilities Act of Utah
"·as patterned after the Interstate Commerce Act, and
the foregoing quote from the Abilene case could be re-
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peated verbatim as fully applicable to the Public Utilities
Act of the State of Utah.
A comparison of the provisions in the various sections of Title 54, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, definitely
confirms this to be a fact. 54-3-1 says all charges shall be
just and reasonable and every unjust or unreasonable
charge is prohibited and declared unlawful. 54-3-2 imposes a duty on every carrier of filing with the P.S.C.U.
its schedules of rates, and 54-3-6 prohibits a carrier from
engaging in any transportation until its rates and charges
have been filed and published. 54-3-6 (3) prohibits preferences, discriminations or reduced or free transportation.
54-3-7 makes it unlawful to depart from the rates established in tariffs on file and in effect, and forbids refunds
and rebates. 54-3-8 again forbids preferences. At the
end of the title, 54-7-25 to 28 refers to violations of any
part of Title 54 and provides numerous and severe penalties, and 54-7-24 gives a right of injunction to stop
threatened violations. 54-3-11 again forbids rebates or
preferences which might be accomplished by any machination or falsification. In connection with the requirement
of filing schedules of rates with the P.S.C.U., sec.
54-3-2 (2) confers power upon the P.S.C.U. to prescribe
"the form of the schedules." Chapter 4 of Title 54
gives the P.S.C.U. broad and plenary po"'"ers to supervise all utilities, to investigate their affairs ( 54-4-2), prescribe and investigate their accounts and records ( 54-4-22
to 24) (54-7-19), regulate rules, equipment and service
( 54-4-7) and require improvements, extensions and repairs ( 54-4-8). Even track connections, spurs and switch-
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ing service (54-4-10 and 11) and regulation of safety appliances and joint use of facilities ( 34-4-13 and 14) is
included. Power is conferred upon such commission to
hear complaints and to make investigations either upon
complaint of any party (54-7-9) or upon its own motion
(;)4-4-2). Power is given to hear and determine reparations (54-7-20) and to have the help of the courts, the
Attorney General and district attorneys in enforcing its
orders and all laws affecting public utilities (54-7-21).
It would be hard to conceive a law giving more discretion and broader coverage than does such Utah la\v.
The quotation at the bottom of page 31 and top of
page 32 of appellant's brief taken from the case of Southern Pac. v. Superior Court, 150 Pac. 397, can be paraphrased and is very apropos here because, as there said,
referring to interpretation of the Interstate Commerce
.A. rt and similar state acts, ''It is evident that the system
of regulation of rates and fares'' as provided by Utah
law was ''modeled upon the federal Act for the regulation of commerce between the states,'' and ''this being so
it will be assumed that the people" of the State of Utah
''in enacting the same or similar terms of their written
la,v, intended to express the same meaning as that established as the true meaning of the law from which these
la,Ys of the state have been derived.''
Referring specifically to reparations and the paramount requirement (which exists in both the federal and
the Utah Act) that all rates must be reasonable and uniform in their application, and in holding that applica-
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tion must first be made to the commission, the United
States Supreme Court in the Abilene case said (at
page 441):

'' * * * This must be, because, if the power
existed in both courts and the Commission to
originally hear complaints on this subject, there
might be a divergence between the action of the
Commission and the decision of a court. In other
words, the established schedule might be found
reasonable by the Commission in the first instance
and unreasonable by a court acting originally, and
thus a conflict would arise which would render the
enforcement of the act impossible.''
(Page 442):

'' * * * This becomes particularly cogent when
it is observed that the power of the courts to
award damages to those claiming to have been injured, as provided in the section, contemplates
only a decree in favor of the individual complainant, redressing the particular wrong asserted to
have been done, and does not embrace the power
to direct the carrier to abstain in the future from
similar violations of the act ; in other words, to
command a correction of the established schedules,
which power, as we have shown is conferred by the
act upon the Commission in express terms. * * *
Although an established schedule of rates may
have been altered by a carrier voluntarily or as the
result of the enforcement of an order of the Commission to desist from violating the la,Y, rendered
in accordance \vith the provisions of the statute,
it may not be doubted that the power of the Commission would nevertheless extend to hearing legal
complaints of and a\varding reparation to indiYiduals for wrongs unlawfully suffered from the application of the unreasonable schedule during the
period when such schedule was in force.''
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The Court further stated (at page 446) :
'' • • • When the Commission is called upon
on the complaint of an individual to consider the
reasonableness of an established rate, its power is
invoked not merely to authorize a departure from
such rate in favor of the complaint alone, but to
exert the authority conferred upon it by the act, if
the complaint is found to be just, to compel the
establishment of a new schedule of rates applicable
to all. * * * "
The foregoing quotations consist of only a part of
the enlightening discussion by the Court in the Abilene
case, but the reasons therein contained apply just as
strongly, if not more so, to the Utah Act as to the Interstate Commerce Act. We commend the court to a thorough study of that Abilene case.
On page 30 of their brief appellants argue: ''In this
case the question of whether or not the tariffs are too
high or too low is beside the point." The question of the
reasonableness of such rates is not beside the point but
a necessary part of plaintiffs' case if plaintiff claims
under a common law theory. The Supreme Court in the
Abilene case with respect to this said:
'' • * • Even under plaintiffs' own theory, recovery could not be had unless the rates as
charged and collected were unreasonable and excessive. * * * ''

Under the common law right of action it had to be
alleged and proved that the rates as charged and collected were unreasonable and excessive and plaintiffs
never even attempted to so show.
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The only case which counsel cites in an attempt to
support appellants' claimed common law right is the case
of Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 60
Utah 153, 207 Pac. 155, which he says confirms the existence of a common law right of action, and he adds that
the annotator of the Utah Code also thought this case
reserved common law right. Such would be true \vith
respect to the law involved in that case, but an annotator does not go further to analyze changes which may be
made in statutes and their effect after such changes, and
we have never understood that an annotator's opinion
should be considered as binding precedent, otherwise
annotator's opinions might give binding interpretative
law upon our whole body of statutes.
In that first Jeremy case there was no Public Service Commission or Public Utilities Commission to apply
to during the period there involved. The rates and
charges there involved were paid during the period between November 20, 1914, and March 7, 1917. The Utah
Public Utilities Act, Chapter 47, Session La\YS, 1917, became effective on approval on March 8, 1917. Thus \ve
have no need to quarrel with the statement that a common
law right of action was available as set forth in the
Jeremy case in 60 Utah 153, but such common la\v right
was no longer available after that date. It "rill be noted
that that Jeremy case \vas decided in ~lay of 1922, and the
complaint in that case, as stated in the first paragraph of
the opinion, was filed in ~larch, 1919, t\vo years after the
Public Utilities Act \Yent into effect. In vie\\T of this \Ve
want to call attention of court and counsel to the fact that
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the .Jeremy E-,uel Co. filed a subsequent case, \vhich is
reportPd in 63 Utah, beginning at page 392, and that in
tht~ second case the period covered by the excessive
charges as claimed was from l\Iarch 8, 1917, to December
31, 1917. "\V e \vill ask why was the period jro1n Jl arch 8,
1917, to Dec. 31, 1917, not included in the first action,
ll'h ich 1ua.s not filed until1919? In the second Jeremy Fuel
action, which covered the period from 1Iarch 8, 1917 on,
thP FuQl Co. filed its petition with the Public Utilities
Commission, wherein it "asked for reparations" covering the period following l\1arch 8, 1917.
The statute as originally enacted and as worded at
the time of the second Jeremy case, merely allowed reparations where charges were made'' in excess of the schedules, rates and tariffs on file with the Commission" or
"?here the carrier had "discriminated under said schedules against the complainant. * * *" See Section 19, Chapter 47, I.Ja\vs of Utah, 1917. Because of the fact that the
carrier had not charged rates "in excess of schedules,
rates and tariffs on file," reparation \vas denied, and it
\vas apparently assumed by all concerned that there was
no common law right which could be then invoked .
.1\.fter the case of Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Pub·lic l"'tilities Conzmission, 73 Utah 139,273 Pac. 939 (1928),
the la\v \vas amended by Session La\\"S of 1929, since \vhich
time, and at the present time, the statute provides that
the Commission can grant reparations for charges ''in
excess of the schedules, rates and tariffs on file \Yith the
Commission" or where the carrier "has charged an un-
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just, unreasonable or discriminatory amount against the
complainant.'' Thus, if there were any question before,
it cannot now be doubted that the power is lodged definitely in the Commission to the exclusion of any common law right to have the Commission hear and determine
whether a carrier has charged any ''unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory amount,'' and the Commission is
given power to order that the utility "make due reparation.'' If the reparation order is not complied with, ''suit
may be instituted in any court of competent jurisdiction
to recover the same. ' '
It is interesting here to point out that since the enactment of the Utah Public Utilities Act there has been
no case (at least this counsel has found none) wherein
this court has held such a common law right to exist,
although there have been several where it might properly have been urged if anyone thought it available, but
instead, as in the second Jeremy case, relief has been
sought under the reparations provision of the statute.
See Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. et al. v. Public Utilities
Commission, 63 Utah 392, 226 Pac. 456; Utah-Idaho Central Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 64 Utah 54,
227 Pac. 1025; Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 73 Utah 139, 272 Pac. 939.
Other states having statutes similar to the Utah statutes have held that the state statute supersedes and leaves
no common law remedy available.

Hewitt Logging Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 166
Pac. 1153 (Washington). The plaintiff company sued for
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\vhat it claimed was an overcharge. It had not made any
previous application to the State Public Utilities Commission. The Washington Public Utilities Act was very
similar to the Utah Act, including the section providing
for reparations. The Washington statute also provided
(at page 1155):
''This act shall not have the effect to release or
waive any right of action by the state or any person for any right, penalty or forfeiture which may
have arisen or may hereafter arise under any law
of this state.''
This provision is practically identical with the provisions of U. C. A. sec. 54-7-23 ( 1).
In the Washington case there was in addition a
provision in the State Constitution which re-affirmed all
common law rights; however, in holding that an application to the public utilities commission was a prerequisite
to any action at law to recover for excessive rates, the
Supreme Court of the State of Washington said at
page 1154:
''We may grant that the Constitution declares
the common law, but it does not follow that the
Legislature may not occupy its acknowledged field
and define procedures and :fix limitations upon the
assertion of the right preserved. * * * ''
''To define procedure, to make a condition
precedent, and to :fix a limitation does not destroy
the force of the Constitution. On the contrary, a
law so providing makes it efficient, certain, and
uniform in its operation. The substantive right
remains; that is all the citizen can insist upon, for
it is held, under authority without limit, that no
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litigant has a vested right in procedure so long as
his right of action is not abolished.''
At page 1156:
''The claim for the overcharge was not made
by respondent's assignor within the time fixed by
law. The condition precedent to the right to sue is
non-existent. The complaint does not state a cause
of action.''
The State of North Dakota likewise has a statute
similar, if not identical, to the Utah statute. lVoodrich,
et al v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 71 F. 2d 732. In this case
the plaintiffs sought to claim under a common law right
damages for ''alleged unreasonable, extortionate and
discriminatory freight rates.'' The court stated that there
was no claim or allegation in the complaint that the rates
were not those regularly filed and published with the
Commission. '' * * * It is the claim of plaintiffs that
under the North Dakota laws a common law action may
be maintained to recover damages because of the exaction of unreasonable and discriminatory rates, even
though such rates be those named in the published tariffs
of the carrier approved by the Railroad Commission.''
In denying this claim and holding that application to the
Commission for reparation was a. condition precedent,
the three-judge federal court hearing the case stated at
page 734:
''It seems clear that the entire subject of intrastate freight rates in the state of North Dakota. is
under the exclusive control of the Board of Railroad Commissioners. The powers vested in the
North Dakota. Board of Railroad Commissioners
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are even broader and more sweeping than those
eonferred on the Interstate Commerce Commission. Manifestly, the main purpose of these regulatory statutes was to compel the establishment of
uniform rates for all persons entitled to transport
goods over the railroads, and to afford convenient
facilities for ascertaining \vhat are the established
rates, and to prevent preferences and discriminations. By the very provisions of the statutPs, the
carriers are prohibited from collecting from any
person a greater or less rate than is specified in
the published schedule. The carrier in this case,
having adopted, filed, and published schedules of
rates applicable to the shipments involved, was
bound to charge and collect that rate and no
other."
The Montana Supreme Court has held that under its
statutes no common law right of action remains, even
though it also holds that under its state law the state
commission cannot grant reparations for past charges this on the theory that all rates in the state of Montana
must be set and prescribed by the commission, and having been so set by the commission, the commission cannot grant reparation with respect to rates it has set or
approved. See Doney v. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co., 199 Pac. 432.
In spite of the fact that the commission can grant no
reparations, Montana said that under its statute the
commission first must be authorized to determine the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the rate in question and thus an application to the commission is a prerequisite, and the ~fontana Supreme Court affirmed the
lo,ver court in sustaining a demurrer to a complaint
\vhere application had not been first made to the commission to consider the reasonableness of the rates.
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The case of Frank A. Graham Ice Co. v. Chicago M.
St. Ry Co., 140 N.W. 1097, involved a Wisconsin statute
similar to the Utah statute wherein an action for reparations was filed with the court without ·first applying to the
state commission. The court in that case refers to the
various sections of its statute which will bear out the
comparisons to the Utah statute and says (page 1099):
''It is plain from the statutes upon the subject
that the legislature intended to and did provide an exclusive remedy for the fixing of freight
charges. 4 4 4 ' '
Page 1101:
'' * * * The statutes referred to show that the
whole matter of fixing rates and the remedies for
excessive charges is lodged with the Railroad
Commission. * * * ''

'' * * * The plaintiff had no standing in any
court for reparation until it first applied to the
Railroad Commission for relief in the manner provided by the statutes.''
From the various cases cited it will appear that rates
are sometimes set voluntarily by carriers and sometimes
by the commission and sometimes, as with Montana, are
set exclusively by the commission, with the commission
having no power itself to grant reparations but still
being required to determine reasonableness. Here we
would ask, if Utah rates should be considered as being
required to be set by the commission in all instances, then
why should we haYe a reparation statute? We have such
a statute, and some field in 'vhich it may function must
be found in the fabric of our statutory law. That field
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only be in instances \vhere tariffs are filed and become effective, \Vhich have not been prescribed by or
approved by the commission; and in such instances if
a shipper seeks to attack, then he should do so, after
sneh rates have been paid, by application under the
reparations provisions of the statute to allow the commission to do its duty in maintaining uniformity. See
State v. J>ublic Service Commission of Kansas, 11 P.
('clll

~d

999.

\V e \vould also like to refer here to the case of A rizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
284 U.S. 370, 76 L.Ed. 348, 52 S. Ct. 183, wherein the United States Supreme Court referred to the Interstate
Commerce Act but stated law that is applicable to the
Utah Public Utilities Act, saying at page 384:

''The Act altered the common law by lodging
in the Commission the power theretofore exercised
by courts, of determining the reasonableness of a
published rate. If the finding on this question was
against the carrier, reparation was to be awarded
the shipper, and only the enforcement of the award
\vas relegated to the courts.''
See also Southern Pacific v. R. R. Commission, 231
Par. 28 (Cal.).
The only conclusion that can be drawn from the authorities is that under Utah la\v there may be commission-prescribed rates, and there may be carrier-established rates. If such rates as established by a carrier
either voluntarily or involuntarily are unjust or unreason-
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able, they still have the force of law and before any
shipper can disregard them or require restitution for
amounts paid thereunder, the Commission in the first instance must hear a.nd determine the fact of their reasonableness and whether they are either excessive, inadequate or otherwise; and after such determination by the
Commission the courts can then enforce any order made
where the Commission has found reparations to be due.
The case of Southern Pac. v. Superior Court, 150 Pac.
397, cited by counsel on page 31 of appellants' brief is
not in point to the contrary. That case arose under the
"long and short-haul" clause of the California State
Constitution, and with respect thereto the California
District Court of Appeal said at page 403:

"* * * But the plaintiff's claim in this action
was that the Constitution of the State of California
prohibited the defendant from collecting a higher
freight charge on transportation of goods from
Oakland to Bakersfield, than the established rate
for a like kind of goods shipped from Oakland to
Los Angeles. * * * If the charge was thus in conflict with the Constitution, it was a charge beyond
the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission. * * • ''
POINT FIVE
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO BASIS IN EQUITY
FOR ANY RECOVERY.
Plaintiffs in this action have throughout the proceedings attempted to avoid any considerations of equity
at all. At page 20, appellants' brief says, "This is not
the theory upon which this case is brought at all." Under
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our law and practice in this day we no longer have the
di8t inction between law cases and equity cases, and courts
are required to administer both law and equity in one
form of action. If the facts show that on equitable considerations plaintiffs are not entitled to recover, the
courts are required to consider such equity regardiess of
how plaintiffs try to "duck" it.
Referring to equity considerations and the duties of
eourts and commissions, the United States Supreme Court
said in U n.ited States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. at 191:

'' * * * Neither body should repeat in this day the
mistake made by the courts of law when equity was
struggling for recognition as an ameliorating system of justice. * * * ''
The plaintiffs in this case neither pleaded nor attempted to prove any equity but frankly admitted that
the charges paid by plaintiffs, for which they now seek
reimbursement, had been passed on to the plaintiffs' customers. ( R. 95 to 98) Very obviously any recovery now
\vould thus amount to a windfall to plaintiffs, with no
equitable basis therefor in face of an original and reaffirming order by the I.C.C. that except for the rates
charged the defendants had been discriminated against
and denied needed revenues.
Appellants' brief on pages 21 and 22 refers to the
.A.rizona Grocery Co. case, and we refer to the following
'vording taken from that case, (284 U.S. 384) wherein
the l~nited States Supreme Court said that the Interstate
Commerce Act (after which the Utah Act is patterned)
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'' * * * expressly affirms the common law duty to charge no
more than a reasonable rate and left upon the carrier
the burden of conforming its charges to the standard.
* * * Under section 6 the shipper was bound to pay the
legal rate; but if he could show that it was unreasonable,
he might recover reparation.'' The burden thus was on
the shipper to show that the rate paid was unreasonable.
Appellants' brief, page 23, referring to the Florida
case, said that there,
' ' * * • The shippers were attempting to recover on an equitable basis and not on a legal
basis. * • • ''

We ask, where, in either report of such case, can he
point to for such a conclusion' The case says that after
the reversal by the Supreme Court, the shippers petitioned the federal court for restitution of the difference
in rates which they had paid. (295 U.S. at 307) In the
case at bar plaintiffs filed a complaint in the state court
asking for restitution of the difference. What reason is
there to apply equitable principles in deciding the Florida
case and refusing to apply them in the case at bar'
The Circuit Court of Appeals in the Structural Steel
case, 269 F. 2d at 718, referred to alternatives, one of
which was that in the final event the I.C.C. might not find
facts to support their past conclusions and that thus their
findings and report might be prospective only, leaving
their

order

unsupported;

after

which

the

court

added: ''in which event the right to prevail would depend
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upon traditional notions of equity as in Atlantic Coast
ljiue R. Co. v. Florida.''
We submit the plaintiffs are not in equity entitled to
the relief sought.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs confidently urge that the I.C.C. had
ample jurisdiction to make the investigation and to issue
findings and an order pursuant thereto. The order as
issued by it was not void, but under ''such a context''
'vas at most voidable as subject to being set aside for
error in the proceedings through which the I.C.C. had
exercised its jurisdiction. It was set aside by the Supreme Court and the matter remanded for further proceedings, indicating that the Supreme Court considered
that the matter was subject to correction in further proceedings. The order was in force for two years, and valid
tariffs were filed and maintained ''on file and in effect''
for that period of time. While the order was in force
and in effect before being set aside and while tariffs were
on file and in effect, the order and the tariffs filed pursuant to it had to be complied with under severe penalties
of la,v. The further proceedings by the I.C.C. have confirmed and given support to the prior order. The discrimination has continued to exist over the entire period,
even though the railroads were unable to collect the increased rates during the period of time after the tariffs
'vere cancelled (K-36, Exhibit 4) pursuant to the reversal and order remanding the matter to the I.C.C. If
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the rates were in excess of what could have been considered a reasonable rate during the period they were
paid, the plaintiffs had ample statutory authority to file
proceedings with the Public Service Commission of Utah,
giving that body a chance to pass on the reasonableness
of the rates and to grant reparation if justified. Defendant submits that the judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed in toto.
Respectfully submitted

BRYAN P. LEVERICH
A. U. MINER
S. N. CORNWALL
WOOD R. WORSLEY
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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